Abstract-The Chinese house price was raised rapid and sustain, some scholars thought that the reason is the nonelasticity demand, it is said that the action of collusion of the firms is the maximum of profit. To test if the reason of collusion of housing firms in China was they faced to a nonelasticity demand, so the continuous dynamical system of duopoly Cournot game with constant elasticity demand is derived in our paper, and the stability of this system is studied, finnally the Cournot game with n-competitors is discussed. A general conclusion of existence of Nash-Cournot equilibrium was drew. The collusion of housing firms no came from the profits maximization with non-elasticity demand. The way of land supply which makes increasing marginal cost of house maybe the reason of collusion of housing supply. The conclusion of there are no solution to deal with the rapid and sustain raising of Chinese house price is wrong and Puu and Zhang made mistakes in their papers.
INTRODUCTION
Cournot model descript an industry for oligopoly with linear demand, the elasticity with respect to price for linear demand is from   to 0 . A special case is the housing market in China. On the supply hand, the land on which the house will be built belongs to the government, and the government sell the land to developer to develop, it ensure that have a few supplier in the housing market; on the demand hand, the resident must to buy a house themselves to get a "Household Registered" become a registered permanent residence, and the registered permanent residence will get some benefits such as education of children, unemployment insurance, etc.. It ensures the nonelasticity demand with respect to price. There was a view in Chinese housing industry that the reason of the continued raising of housing price was they faced to a non-elasticity demand. To test this view, we consider a special situation of a duopoly game, don't like the paper of Cournot (1883) , neither like the paper of Puu (1991) , Kopel (1996) , nor Agiza (1998) . We discuss an oligopoly structure with a constant elasticity demand with respect to price but not restrict to 1, construct a dynamic 
, where  is the demand elasticity with respect to price, dp dq is the derivative of q with respect to p , this demand has unitary elasticity at every point.
The special case is the estate market in China. On the supply hand, the land on which the house will be built belongs to the government, and the government sell the land to developer to develop, it ensure that have a few supplier in the estate market; on the demand hand, the resident must to buy a house themselves to get a "Household Registered" become a registered permanent residence, and the registered permanent residence will get some benefits such as education of children, unemployment insurance, etc.. It ensures the inelasticity demand with respect to price.
The paper organized as follows. In section 2, we derive the dynamical system of duopoly Cournot supply faces an inelasticity demand. Section 3, we describe the trace of this dynamical system intuitively. Section 4, a discussion of the general case with n-competitors. The last section is conclusion.
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II. CONTINOUS DYNAMIC DOUPOLY SUPPLY FACES INELASTICITY DEMAND
A. An inelasticity demand For the reason of convenient, we used an inverse demand function but a demand function of constant elasticity with respect to price：
So the elasticity of demand respect with price is:
The absolute value of elasticity, 1   , so it must be an inelasticity demand.
And because of the constant of  ,so the elasticity is constant, and the inverse demand function
is an inelasticity demand function.
B. The continuous Cournot duopoly game
For reason to the intuitive of description, we choose duopoly game in a two dimensions space. The firm in the duopoly game mediates supply of itself to affect the price and determine the cost; it will affect its revenues and maximize the profit.
At a state of continuous time, we get the dynamical system as follow: q ).
C. The dynamics of Cournot duopoly game
We introduce the demand function into the dynamical system, and analysis the stability of this system. Firm 1 choose the supply of itself in account of the supply of firm 2 and the total cost of itself to maximize the profit of firm 1, we have:
As the same, the profit of firm 2:
Input the inverse demand function (1) to (6) and (7), the profit functions:
We assume that the marginal cost is constant. Input (8) and (9) to (4) and (5), we have: 
The curve, 
